Clustered Disclosures by Competing Firms: The Choice of Reporting Periods by Fried, Dov & Sinha, Nishi
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1080483
Clustered Disclosures by Competing Firms:  The Choice of Reporting Periods
by
Dov Fried
New York University
40 West 4th Street,
New York, NY 10012.
hfried@stern.nyu.edu
Nishi Sinha**
Boston University
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
nishi@bu.edu
(617) 353-2927
**Corresponding Author
This version:  February 2008
Abstract:
In some industries firms schedule their disclosure at about the same time, usually around the end
of the business cycle, whereas in others such disclosures are more dispersed over time.  This paper
examines a firm’s choice of a fiscal year-end (and hence of disclosure timing) relative to the business
cycle and to the timing chosen by other firms in the industry.  We model a stochastic setting in which the
periodic closing of books yields information that is relevant for subsequent managerial decisions.  The
results show that while it is business seasonality that is the primary determinant of reporting period
choice, competitive forces in the form of information transfer effects and proprietary disclosure costs
have the ability to make firms' fiscal years deviate from the business cycle.  Such deviations are more
likely when auto-correlation in firms' annual costs is low, when within-season variations in business
conditions are low, when uncertainty is primarily about industry-wide rather than firm-specific factors,
and/or when affordable opportunities exist for collecting information that the year-end closing of books
typically provides.  Further, if incumbent firms are already reporting at the end of the business season,
newer firms may have a greater inclination to make a different choice.  The results also offer a novel
rationale for why the end of the business cycle is an attractive fiscal year-end. The desire to receive
information at an opportune time, rather than the ease of collecting information or any other factors,
makes the end of business cycle an attractive year-end in our setting.
Keywords:  Information Acquisition, Disclosure, Competition, Timing, Fiscal year-end
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1080483
1
Clustered Disclosures by Competing firms:  The Choice of Reporting Periods
1. Introduction
This study investigates the strategic choice of reporting periods (e.g., fiscal year-ends) by
competing firms.  While the length of the reporting period is often dictated by regulation, firms have
discretion over when the reporting period will end and, therefore, when information will be disclosed.
For instance, US GAAP requires that firms furnish audited financial reports annually but leaves the
choice of the fiscal year-end up to the firms.  Conventional wisdom holds that this choice is governed by
factors such as seasonality, regulation or simply convention.
1
  However, if such industry-level factors
were the only determinants of this choice, we would observe near-uniformity in financial year-ends
within industries.  In contrast, evidence based on Compustat firms (Table 1) shows that even though
12/31 is the most popular year-end in all sectors, overall only about seventy percent of the firms choose a
December year-end.  The degree of fiscal year-end clustering (around 12/31 or other dates) varies widely
across industries, suggesting that there may be firm-specific and strategic factors at play as well.
Evidence from firms that change their fiscal year-ends also confirms the presence of strategic
concerns in the choice of reporting periods.  A review of announcements by nearly a hundred firms that
changed their fiscal year between 2003 and 2007 (including prominent firms such as BearingPoint, Tivo
and Sears Roebuck) shows that, other than mergers and acquisitions, better alignment with operating
cycle and/or with industry peers were the reasons cited most often for the change.  For instance, in
changing its fiscal year-end from 12/31 to 1/31 TiVo offered that such a change will "help to align the
seasonal patterns of demand in TiVo's business with the Company's reporting cycle" and will also "better
align the Company's own promotional activities with those of its retail, service and network partners."
                                                 
1  For instance, in the retail industry most financial year-ends are in January, when inventory levels are at
post-Christmas lows.  Education services firms often choose June 30, the end of the school year, as their
financial year-end.  Firms that have the government as their major customer keep the government’s fiscal
year is mind in determining their own reporting periods.
2Evidence therefore points to business seasonality and the reporting periods of industry peers as being
important factors in firms’ reporting period choice.
We model a firm’s choice of reporting period in the presence of business seasonality and
competitive concerns.  In contrast to the “herding” behavior explained by Dye and Sridhar [1995] and
empirically examined by studies such as Brown, Gordon and Wermers [2006] where the focus is on ex
post disclosure decisions (i.e., disclosure decisions that are made after observing the realized signals), the
subject of our analysis is the ex ante scheduling of periodic disclosures, and the extent to which such
schedules are affected by business seasonality and the choices made by other firms in the industry.
Scheduled periodic disclosures, such as the release of quarterly or annual reports, require
extensive collation and summarization of information.  This process often yields information that is
valuable for internal management purposes as well.  For instance, the size of many contingencies,
conversions, bonuses, distributions and even many accruals becomes clear only at the end of a reporting
period (when books are closed).  Thus, the choice of reporting periods determines not just when
information is released to external parties but also when some managerially relevant information is
updated for internal use.  In this sense the choice of reporting periods is a simultaneous choice about the
timing of both information acquisition as well as information disclosure.
2
In a stochastic setting in which the periodic closing of books yields information necessary for
inclusion in external reports and also information that is relevant for subsequent managerial decisions, the
analysis first establishes reporting period choice in the absence of competitive concerns.  The
monopolist’s choice is dictated exclusively by managerial need for updated information and serves as a
benchmark when we introduce competition in the form of a second firm.  The incentives of the second
firm that enters the industry are influenced by at least two additional economic forces.  First, the report of
                                                 
2  Since firms are required to disclose material information in a timely fashion, collecting but not
releasing material information may not be an option. New Securities & Exchange Commission
regulations require firms to file annual reports on Form 10-K within 60 days (reduced from 90 days) after
the end of each fiscal year and quarterly reports on Form 10-Q within 35 days (reduced from 45 days)
after the end of each fiscal quarter. These new filing rules apply to fiscal years ending after December 15,
2003.
3the existing firm offers an additional source of information (an information transfer effect).  Second, the
relative positioning of the fiscal year, and hence the timing of disclosure, may affect the magnitude of the
proprietary costs of disclosing information to a rival.  These new forces have the potential to lead the
second firm to choose a reporting period different from the one chosen by the monopolist.
The results show that the incentive to choose fiscal years that coincide with the business season
are high when serial correlation in the uncertain parameter (e.g., costs) is relatively high.  High serial
correlation means that knowledge of costs from the prior season is critical for estimating costs in the
current season.  Firms, therefore, have an incentive to arrange their reporting periods to obtain prior
season's information as quickly as possible, and locating their fiscal year-end at the end of the business
season accomplishes that best.  If all firms in the industry face the same business season, they end up
choosing identical reporting periods and we observe clustered year-ends.
A major advantage of choosing a fiscal year that does not coincide with the business season is
that by doing so firms can close their books and update their information part way through the ongoing
season.  Firms, therefore, can receive updated information about earlier parts of the ongoing season and
this information, if relevant, could be exploited for the remainder of the season.
3
  The value of this
information depends on how cyclical the business season is.  In industries with highly cyclical sales or
costs, information from January is of little value in predicting sales or costs in October.  As a result of the
diminished relevance of early-season information, the incidence of fiscal years that don’t coincide with
the business season may be lower in industries that have more within-season variations in their business.
The results also show that a firm may have an incentive to deviate from the business cycle and
from rivals' choices when cross-correlation between the rivals' costs is high.  High cross correlation
strengthens the information transfer effects.  The ability to learn about own costs after observing the
rival's report is greater when cross-sectional correlation is high.  In this case when firms stagger their
reporting periods, they have multiple opportunities to update their own information.  Information is
                                                 
3
 For instance, if a firm that operates in an industry with a calendar business cycle chooses a June year-
end, in the latter half of the calendar year it will have information about the first six months of the current
season that it can exploit in the remaining six months.
4sometimes updated by preparing one’s own report and sometimes by observing the rivals’ reports.  Thus,
dispersed year-ends are more likely in industries where firms' costs are highly correlated or when rivals’
financial reports are informative about trends in industry-wide rather than firm-specific factors.  This
leads to the seemingly counterintuitive result that similar firms (e.g., those whose costs are highly
correlated) may be more likely to choose dispersed disclosure timing.
If firms can affordably obtain some of the information that the year-end closing of the books
yields before the fiscal year formally ends, dispersed year-ends become more likely.  When there is an
alternative source of information besides the financial reporting process, firms can exploit the benefits of
a fiscal year that does not end with the business season (greater information about more current shocks)
without foregoing the benefits of closing with the business season (critical information from the previous
season is available earlier in the new season).  Given recent innovations in information technology that
have made data collection and collation easier and more affordable, managers may no longer have to wait
till the end of the fiscal year to obtain certain types of information.  This would suggest that, ceteris
paribus, dispersed year-ends are more likely in more recent years.
Finally, the results also suggest that if there already exist some firms that are reporting at the end
of the business season, newer entrants are more likely to choose a fiscal year that does not coincide with
the business season.  The reports of existing firms may serve as an effective source of information about
the previous season, which makes it easier for subsequent firms to deviate from the business season in
their reporting period choice.
In summary, the results suggest that fiscal years that don't coincide with the industry business
cycle as well as dispersed year-ends for industry firms are more likely when annual costs exhibit low
serial correlation or when cyclical fluctuations within the business season are relatively low.  They are
also more likely in industries where firms' costs are highly correlated or where uncertainty is about
industry-wide rather than firm-specific factors. Since recent years have made information collection
easier and less costly, dispersed year-ends may also be more likely to be observed in more recent years.
5Finally, in an industry where several incumbent firms are already reporting with the business season,
newer firms may be more likely to choose a different year-end.
Prior literature offers few explanations for what determines firms' fiscal year choice.  While
Smith and Pourciau (1988) empirically document differences in the size and risk profile of December and
non-December firms, they do not address the question of what may lead to the patterns they observe.
Huberman and Kandel (1989) confirm that larger firms are more likely to choose December year-ends.
Based on an international dataset, Kamp (2002) examines international diversity in fiscal year-ends and
finds that much of continental Europe exceeds the US in terms of the popularity of December as a year-
end.  In contrast, in countries such as the UK, New Zealand and Australia non-December year-ends are
far more popular than they are in the US.  These differences are explained mostly by reporting or tax
regulation at the national level.  Kamp (2002) also provides preliminary evidence that, as compared to
other countries in his sample, in the US fiscal year choice is more influenced by business characteristics.
The results in this paper provide insights about specific aspects of industry and firm characteristics that
may influence fiscal year choice.
Our model explains a firm’s disclosure timing relative to the timing chosen by other industry co-
members.  With the possible exception of Dye and Sridhar [1995], who also provide a potential
explanation for disclosures that occur in herds within the same industry, the choice of timing relative to
other firms has not been investigated.  Since their model looks at ex post disclosures (as against
disclosures that are scheduled and committed to in advance, as in our model), the herding behavior is
prompted by investors’ belief revision and increased skepticism about the receipt of information by other
firms in the industry after observing disclosure by one firm.  Competitive forces are not a part of their
model.   Similar to our work but also without considering competitive forces, Pae [1999] also examines
the amount of costly information to acquire, its discretionary disclosure (ex post) and the impact of these
decisions on a firm’s productive activities.
Competitive forces are incorporated into Hansen and Sankar’s [1999] model of information
acquisition.  However, their model focuses on the timing for information acquisition, whereas in our
6model firms acquire and then disclose this information publicly.  Making the strategically valuable
information available to competitors provides an additional rich layer of strategic considerations that
influence timing choices in our model.  Additionally, while their model looks for the length of the data
acquisition cycle, we focus on the timing within a particular cycle.
4
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  After setting up the basic model in Section 2 we
analyze the reporting period choices of the monopolist and duopolists in Section 3 and 4.   The paper
concludes with a discussion of the main results in Section 5.
2. The Model
Business Season versus Fiscal Year
All firms in the industry face a common business cycle that spans T operating periods, with the
periods indexed from 1 to T, t !  {1, … , T}.  Firms can choose a fiscal year (also assumed to span T
operating periods) that coincides with the business season, or a fiscal year that spans a different set of T
periods.
5
 Consistent with practice, we assume that firms commit to the reporting periods they choose.
That is, once chosen, changing fiscal years is prohibitively expensive.
Business seasons and fiscal years are denoted by the superscripts B and F, respectively.
6
  A fiscal
year that ends any time during (or with) business season B is termed year F, one that ends during business
season B+1 is termed year F+1, and so on.  (We use the terms business "season" and business "cycle"
interchangeably.)
                                                 
4  Other models that incorporate information acquisition in competitive settings include Li, McKelvy, and
Page [1986] and Kirby [1993].  The former models acquisition choice in terms of the precision of the
signal acquired whereas the latter models it as the number of noisy (and costly) signals to acquire.  The
focus in these models is on the optimal amount of research that the oligopolists individually undertake.  In
contrast, we assume that research yields perfect information and look for the best timing for such research
and its disclosure. Raith [1996] provides an excellent summary of the literature on information sharing in
oligopolies.
5
  The assumption that reporting periods also span T operating periods effectively means that books are
closed (or information is collected) once every season.  This assumption is relaxed later to allow for more
frequent information collection.
6
  The term "year" generically denotes any scheduled reporting period such as a quarter or a year.
7Business cycles are characterized as distinct sets of T operating periods over which cost shocks
cumulate as the business cycle progresses.  As a result, uncertainty is greater, and the value of information
is higher, in operating periods that are closer to the end of the season.
7
  A new business cycle starts with a
fresh slate.  These ideas are made more specific in the following paragraphs.
Industry and Information Structure
Consider a homogenous good industry in which the inverse demand curve in period t is given by
! 
Pricet = A " dQt , where 
! 
Q  is the aggregate output of all firms, and d is a known constant set equal to 1
without loss of generality.  Firms work in an uncertain environment with a constant returns to scale
technology.  In each operating period unit costs are subject to an idiosyncratic and unobservable random
shock
! 
u
it
, where 
! 
u
it
 ~ N(0, v
2
).
8
  Firms learn the magnitude of these shocks ex post, either when books are
closed at the end of the fiscal year or when (and if) firms collect additional information prior to the fiscal
year end.  Further,
Cov(
! 
u
it
,
! 
u
it+n ) = 0
Cov(
! 
u
it
,
! 
u jt ) = r v
2
Cov(
! 
u
it
,
! 
u jt+n ) = 0 (1)
The above assumptions imply, respectively, that (a) individual shocks are serially un-correlated, and that
(b) cross-sectional correlation exists only for contemporaneous shocks with r as the coefficient of
correlation.
Structure of Costs
Firm i's unit costs in the t
th
 operating period of the current business cycle B equal long-term
average costs (
! 
c 
i
), which is a commonly known constant, adjusted for the net impact of all shocks
                                                 
7
  Results remain unchanged when the model is altered to allow sales to be larger as the business cycle
progresses.  This is done by assuming that the demand intercept equals tA (rather than A), and therefore
increases with t.
8
 Although we label the uncertainty to be about “costs”, this is simply a matter of labeling.  These shocks
could equally well be labeled as shocks to the demand intercept A.
8experienced in the prior cycle (
! 
"i
B#1) and the net impact of all the random shocks experienced to date in
the current cycle (
! 
"it
B ).  That is,
! 
Cit
B
 = 
! 
c 
i
 + 
! 
"
! 
"i
B#1 + 
! 
"
! 
"it
B (2)
where 
! 
"i
B#1= 
! 
uik
B"1
k=1
T
# , 
! 
"it
B  = 
! 
uik
B
k=1
t
"  and 
! 
u
it
B  represents cost shock in period t of business cycle B.  For
expositional ease we refer to 
! 
"i
B#1 and 
! 
"it
B  as "prior" and "current" components of costs, respectively.
Following (1), 
! 
"i
B#1 ~ N(0, Tv
2
) and 
! 
"it
B  ~ N(0, tv
2
) and Cov(
! 
"i
B#1,
! 
"it
B  ) = 0.
This formulation captures the property that aggregate information from the prior season (
! 
"i
B#1) as
well as developments since the start of the current season (
! 
"it
B ) are relevant for determining costs in the
current period.  The coefficients 
! 
"  and 
! 
"  (both " 0) calibrate the relative importance of the two
components.  We initially assume that the weight on 
! 
"i
B#1 is greater than the weight on 
! 
"it
B  (that is, 
! 
"  >
! 
" ).  This assumption is based on the following reasoning.  First, since 
! 
"i
B#1 averages random shocks over
a longer period of time (T periods, as compared to the t ! T periods over which 
! 
"it
B  is aggregated) it is
reasonable to put a greater weight on 
! 
"i
B#1.  Second, in industries with cyclical business seasons (so that
the within-season variation in business conditions is high) information from earlier periods in the current
season may not be very informative about conditions in the latter part of the season.  This suggests a
lesser dependence (a lower 
! 
" ) on information from earlier parts of the current season and a greater
dependence (a higher 
! 
" ) on last season’s complete information when estimating costs in such industries.
To allow for the fact that more recent shocks 
! 
"it
B  may be more relevant - even though they span a
shorter time series - we relax the (
! 
"  > 
! 
" ) assumption in later analysis.
It is also worth noting that although individual shocks 
! 
u
it
 are independent across time, since unit
costs 
! 
Cit
B
 depend on cumulated shocks, average annual unit costs are serially correlated with 
! 
"
#
 as an
indicator of the degree of autocorrelation in annual costs.
9Finally, uncertainty, and therefore the value of information, gets larger as the business season
nears its end.  This property is captured by the variance of current shocks,
! 
"it
B , which equals tv
2 
and
increases with t.
Information in Financial Reports
When books are closed at the end of the fiscal year, which may or may not coincide with the
business season, the reporting firm learns perfectly all shocks experienced in the prior fiscal year.  Thus,
at the beginning of year F (equivalently, at the end of fiscal year F-1) financial report 
1!F
iy  reveals cost
shocks incurred in the previous T operating periods.  Since the report is publicly disclosed, this
information becomes available to competitors as well.
9
Production Decisions
Given all information available at the beginning of any production period t, t ! {1, …, T}, and
taking as given the reporting schedule, each firm independently chooses output to maximize expected
profits in that period.  Unless firms collect additional information that is not publicly released (as in
Section 4.2), the Cournot game is one of symmetric information.
3. Business Seasonality Only – the Monopolist's Choice
To isolate the impact of business seasonality we first examine the placement of the fiscal year
(relative to the business cycle) in the absence of competitive concerns.  Suppose monopolist m closes the
books M periods after the start of the business cycle, where 0!M!T.  Assuming no additional information
collection, cost estimates in the first M periods of business cycle B will rely on information collected
when the books were last closed to prepare fiscal year (F-1) report, 
! 
ym
F"1.  Since this report was prepared
                                                 
9
 We assume that both the reporting firm as well as the rival observes not just aggregate prior period
shocks, 
! 
"i
F#1, but also each of the T components of 
! 
"i
F#1.  Alternatively, we can assume that reporting
process reveals the components to the reporting firm, but only the aggregate amount is disclosed in the
report.  The expected profit expressions for this set-up are large and unwieldy.  These results are available
as Mathematica files from the authors.
10
at the end of the Mth period in the previous (B-1) business cycle, the monopolist cost estimates in each of
the first M periods of the current business cycle B are:
E(
! 
C
mt
B | 
! 
ym
F"1) = 
! 
c 
m
 + 
! 
"
!
!
"
#
$
$
%
&
'
=
(
M
B
m
u
1
1
)
) for t ! {1, …, M} (3)
After the Mth period the monopolist closes the books for fiscal year F and learns the remaining T-
M components of the previous cycle's shocks (
! 
"
m
B#1) as well as the first M components of the current
cycle's shocks (
! 
"
mt
B ).  Cost estimates in each of the latter (T-M) periods in business cycle B therefore are:
E(
! 
C
mt
B |
! 
ym
F"1, 
! 
ym
F ) = 
! 
c 
m
 + 
! 
"
! 
"
m
B#1 + 
!
!
"
#
$
$
%
&
'
=
M
B
m
u
1(
()  for t ! {M+1, …, T} (4)
Given these cost estimates, optimal expected profits over all T periods of the business cycle are given by:
! 
"
m
#  = 
! 
(A " c 
m
)
2
T
4
 + 
! 
T
2" 2v 2
4
 + 
! 
" 2 #$ 2( )v 2
4
M (T #M )
In the above expression, the first two terms capture expected profits if the monopolist coincides
the fiscal year with the business cycle (M = 0 or T), whereas the last term denotes additional profits from
staggering the fiscal year-end by M periods relative to the end of the business season.  This last term is
positive only if 
! 
"
#
 ! 1 and M > 0.  Fiscal period choice is analogous to the choice of an M that maximizes
these expected profits.  The optimal M is detailed in the following proposition.
Proposition 1:  A monopolist will choose a fiscal year that
! coincides with the business cycle (M* = 0) if 
! 
"
#
 ! 1
!  ends mid-way through the business cycle (M* = 
! 
T
2
) if 
! 
"
#
 < 1
Proof:  See Appendix.
When the fiscal year coincides with the business cycle, in every operating period in the current
cycle the monopolist has complete knowledge of all shocks incurred in the previous cycle (
! 
"i
B#1) but no
knowledge of any shocks incurred in the earlier parts of the current cycle (
! 
"it
B ).  In contrast, when the
fiscal year begins M periods after start of the business season, for the first M periods of the season the
11
monopolist works only with partial knowledge of past shocks (
! 
"i
B#1).  As such, for the first M periods his
expected profits are lower than they would be with a fiscal year that coincided with the business cycle.
The tradeoff to this "initial loss" is that in the latter (T-M) periods the monopolist gains not just complete
knowledge of past shocks 
! 
"i
B#1 but also knowledge of the first M shocks in the current cycle.  In the latter
(T-M) periods, therefore, his profits are greater than they would be with a fiscal year that coincided with
the business cycle ("subsequent gain").  The relative magnitude of the "initial loss" and "subsequent gain"
determine whether the fiscal year coincides with or staggers with respect to the business season.
When 
! 
"  " 
! 
" , that is, when the weight on aggregate shocks from the prior cycle (
! 
"i
B#1) is greater
than the weight on aggregates shocks from the current cycle, 
! 
"it
B , the benefits from gaining knowledge
about 
! 
"it
B
 ("subsequent gain") is not sufficient to compensate for the initial lack of knowledge of 
! 
"i
B#1;
delaying the start of the fiscal year (M>0), therefore is not attractive and M* = 0 maximizes profits.  As
mentioned, the value of 
! 
"  is likely to be relatively small, and the value of 
! 
"  is likely to be relatively
large, in industries with a cyclical business patterns or strong serial correlations in the uncertain
parameter.
Staggering, if chosen, occurs at M* = T/2.  This is because for each period that the firm delays
the start of its fiscal year beyond the start of the business season, expected profits increase by 
! 
" 2 #$ 2( )v2
4
(as long as 
! 
"  < 
! 
" ).  However, delaying also means that these additional profits are obtained for one less
period in the season.  In other words, a higher M increases expected profits by 
! 
" 2 #$ 2( )v2
4
M  but these
increased profits can only be exploited for the remaining (T-M) periods.  These timing tradeoffs yield the
mid-point of the business season as the only feasible staggered year-end.
Finally, it is easy to show that if the monopolist can collect additional information such that,
independent of when the fiscal year ends, at the start of a new business cycle he has complete knowledge
of the previous business cycle's costs 
! 
"i
B#1, then fiscal year-end will always be placed mid-way through
12
the business cycle, M* = 
! 
T
2
. In this case there the "initial loss" would be zero, whereas the "subsequent
gain" would remain unchanged, making the net impact of staggering strictly positive.
4. Business Seasonality together with Competitive Concerns
In the previous section there were no consequences to disclosing information; the monopolist's
choice of a reporting period was driven only by business seasonality and reflected the optimal timing for
acquiring updated information given that seasonality.  Unlike a monopolist, later entrants into the
industry must also take into account the reporting schedule of incumbent firms since fiscal reports of
these firms may serve as additional sources of information.  In addition, because fiscal period choice
determines disclosure timing, such choices can also determine the magnitude of the proprietary costs of
disclosing information to competitors.  In this section we extend the model to include such information
transfer effects and proprietary costs of disclosure.
In what follows, we will initially assume that 
! 
"  " 
! 
"  so that, if it weren't for competitive concerns,
as per Proposition 1 firms would choose to coincide their fiscal years with the business cycle.  Section 4.3
relaxes this assumption and provides an overview of the results when 
! 
"  < 
! 
" .
4.1  No Additional Information
With 
! 
"  " 
! 
" , as per Proposition 1 the first entrant in the industry (firm 1) will choose a fiscal year
that coincides with the business cycle.  Suppose a later entrant (firm 2) chooses a fiscal year that begins M
periods after the start of a new business cycle, where 0 # M # T.  With this choice firm 2's information
environment changes over the business cycle in the following way. When a new business cycle starts, the
latest financial reports available to firm 2 are its own latest report 
! 
y
2
F"1 (released T-M periods before the
start of the current business cycle) and the rival’s latest report 
! 
y
1
F"1 (released at the start of this business
13
cycle).  Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the relative placement of the fiscal years.
10
  Firm 2's
own report 
! 
y
2
F"1 reveals 
! 
"2
F#1, where
! 
"
2
F#1 = 
! 
u
2t
B"2
t=M +1
T
#  + 
! 
u
2t
B"1
t=1
M
# (5)
That is, firm 2's report 
! 
y
2
F"1 reflects shocks from the two separate business cycles, (B-2) and (B-1), that
the fiscal year (F-1) spans.  The last term in (5) represents the first M shocks in 
! 
"
2
B#1 and is the only part
of the report that is relevant for estimating costs in business cycle B.  Therefore, for the first M periods of
business cycle B, firm 2 knows the first M components of 
! 
"
2
B#1 (=
! 
u
2t
B"1
t=1
M
# ) from its own reporting
process.  It estimates the remaining T-M components of 
! 
"
2
B#1 from the publicly available rival's report
! 
y
1
F"1 which covers all periods of the previous business cycle.  Neither of the reports available in the first
M periods contains any information about 
! 
"it
B .  Cost estimates in each of the first M periods in the
business cycle therefore are:
E(
! 
C
2t
B | 
! 
y1
F"1, 
! 
y2
F"1) = 
! 
c 
2
 + 
! 
"
!
!
"
#
$
$
%
&
+ ''
+=
(
=
(
T
M
B
M
B
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1
1
1
1
1
2
*
)
)
)
)  for t ! {1, …, M} (6)
These estimates are maintained for the first M periods of the season.  At the end of the Mth period
firm 2 closes the books for its fiscal year F and perfectly learns the remaining T-M components of the
previous cycle's costs (
! 
"i
B#1) as well as the first M components of the current cycle's shocks (
! 
"
2t
B ). Cost
estimates in each of the last (T-M) periods in the business cycle therefore are:
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 For instance, in Figure 1 when business cycle B starts, for the first four periods firm 2 knows only the
initial four shocks (
! 
u
21
B"1-
! 
u
24
B"1) from the B-1 cycle.  At the end of the fourth period firm 2 closes its books
again and, from that point onwards, knows all the shocks from the B-1 cycle (
! 
u
21
B"1-
! 
u
28
B"1) as well as the
initial four shocks from the current cycle (
! 
u
21
B -
! 
u
28
B ).  As another example, suppose firm 2's business cycle
coincides with the calendar year, but a firm chooses a March year-end.  When the 2008 business cycle
begins, the firm’s books were last closed at the end of March 2007 so that only information up to that
point (three months of data) is known.  Till March 2008, firm 2 will work with these three months of data.
At the end of March 2008 when it closes its books again it will finally have all information about 2007, as
well as information for the first three months of the current 2008 cycle.
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! 
c 
2
 + 
! 
"
! 
"
2
B#1 + 
!
!
"
#
$
$
%
&
'
=
M
B
u
1
2
(
() for t  ! {M+1, …, T} (7)
Firm 1’s cost estimates are analogously determined and are detailed in the Appendix.  With cost
estimates as described above, expected profits over the business cycle (spanning T periods) are:
! 
"
2
# = 
! 
(A " 2c 2 + c 1)
2
T
9
+ 
! 
" 2
! 
(5" 4r)v
2
T
2
9
+
! 
" 2 (2# r)2 # 4$ 2 (1# r 2)( )v 2
9
M (T #M ) (8)
The first two terms together reflect expected profits if the fiscal years of the two firms coincided
with each other (and also with the business cycle), whereas the last term reflects incremental profits if
firm 2's fiscal year were staggered by M periods (and firm 1 continued to report at the end of the business
cycle.  This last term is positive if and only if 
! 
" 2
# 2
<
(2$ r)2
4(1$ r 2)
 and M >0.  Firm 2's choice of a reporting
period is equivalent to choosing an optimal M that maximizes these expected profits.
Proposition 2  If 
! 
"
#
 so that firm 1 chooses to coincide its fiscal year with the business cycle, the
second entrant, firm 2, will choose a fiscal year that
! coincides with the business cycle (and with firm 1's fiscal year) if 
! 
" 2
# 2
$
(2% r)2
4(1% r 2)
.
! ends mid-way through the business cycle (M*=
! 
T
2
) if 
! 
" 2
# 2
<
(2$ r)2
4(1$ r2)
Proof:  See Appendix.
When firm 2 coincides its fiscal year with the business cycle, in every period in the business
season firm 2 always has perfect knowledge of all T components of the prior season's shocks 
! 
"
2
B#1 (but no
knowledge of shocks from earlier in the current, 
! 
"
2t
B ).  In contrast, when firm 2 begins its fiscal year M
periods after the start of the business season, in the first M periods it has perfect knowledge only of the
first M components and only partial knowledge (inferred from the rival's report) of the last (T-M)
components of prior season's shocks, as shown in (6).  As a result of the more limited information,
staggering with respect to the business cycle yields lower expected profits in the first M periods ("initial
loss").  To compensate, though, in the last (T-M) periods of the business cycle firm 2 gains not just
15
complete knowledge of last periods shocks, 
! 
"
2
B#1, but also knowledge about the initial M shocks from
earlier in the current season, as shown in (7).  As a result, expected profits in the last (T-M) periods of the
business season are greater ("subsequent gain") when fiscal years are staggered versus when they coincide
with the business cycle.  The relative magnitude of the "initial loss" and the "subsequent gain" determines
the final outcome.
11
When 
! 
" 2
# 2
$
(2% r)2
4(1% r 2)
, the "subsequent gain" is larger than the "initial loss", making the net impact
of staggering - the last term in (8) - positive.  Firm 2 then maximizes expected profits by staggering its
year-end with respect to the rival.  Further, when staggering it chooses a fiscal year that ends at the mid-
point of the business cycle, M* = 
! 
T
2
.
Coincident fiscal years for the two firms are the outcome only if 
! 
" 2
# 2
$
(2% r)2
4(1% r 2)
.  In this section by
assumption (to be relaxed later) 
! 
"  " 
! 
" , so that the 
! 
" 2
# 2
 " 1.   The right hand side of the above condition is
always less than 1 if r < 0.8.  It follows therefore that this condition is met (so that firm 2 will coincide its
fiscal year with the business cycle, and therefore with firm 1's) when 
! 
"  " 
! 
"  and r < 0.8.  Coincident fiscal
years may also result for some values of r " 0.8 as long as the above condition is satisfied.  In general,
coincident fiscal years are more likely with larger values of 
! 
"
#
 and smaller values of r.
Proposition 2 also suggests that when 
! 
"
#
 ! 1, firm 2 is less likely (than a monopolist) to choose a
fiscal year end that coincides with the business season.  To see this note that when
! 
"
#
 ! 1, the monopolist
coincides with business season for all values of r.  In contrast, when
! 
"
#
 ! 1 the condition for firm 2 to
                                                 
11
 From the last term in (8), 
! 
"4# 2 (1" r 2)v 2
9
M (T "M )  reflects the "initial loss" whereas
! 
" 2 (2# r)2 v 2
9
M (T #M ) is the "subsequent gain."
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coincide, 
! 
" 2
# 2
$
(2% r)2
4(1% r 2)
, is met for all r ! 0.8 but only for certain values of r " 0.8.  The existence of an
incumbent firm that already reports with the business cycle means that a later entrant has a (albeit noisy)
source of information about the prior cycle's costs.  This serves to reduce the "initial loss" and makes
deviation from the business cycle more likely.
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4.2  Additional Information Collection
The prior section assumed that unless firm 2’s fiscal year coincided with the business cycle, for
the first M periods of the new business cycle it did not have a complete estimate of the prior cycle's
shocks, 
! 
"
2
B#1 .  We now assume that at the end of each business cycle firms collect additional information
such that when the new business cycle starts, they always have complete knowledge of prior season’s
shocks, 
! 
"
i
B#1 .  For firm 2, when it starts its fiscal year M periods after the start of the new business
season, the additional information pertains to the last (T-M) shocks in 
! 
"
2
B#1 .  Note specially that this
privately collected information is not disclosed to the rival.  With this assumption, cost estimates in each
of the first M periods are
E(
! 
C
2t
B | 
! 
y1
F"1, 
! 
y2
F"1) =  
! 
c 
2
 + 
! 
"
! 
"
2
B#1 (9)
Cost estimates in the remaining T-M periods remain unchanged and are as described in (7).  Optimal
expected profits over the T periods of the business cycle are:
! 
"
2
# = 
! 
(A " 2c 2 + c 1)
2
T
9
+ 
! 
" 2
! 
(5" 4r)v
2
T
2
9
+
! 
4" 2 (2# r )2 # 7$ 2 (1# r 2)( )v 2
36
M (T #M ) (10)
                                                 
12
  A comparison of the optimal expected profit functions of the two firms shows that, assuming 
! 
c 
1
 =
! 
c 
2
,
the difference in equilibrium expected profits equals (
! 
"
1
#-
! 
"
2
#) = 
! 
r(5r " 4)v 2# 2
12
(T "M )
When fiscal years coincide (for r < 0.8), M = T and expected profits for the two firms are equal.
However, if r " 0.8 firm 2 may have an incentive to stagger so that M < T.  In that case firm 1's
equilibrium profits are greater.  This suggests that the first movers' profits are always at least as large
as firm 2's.
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Proposition 3  If firm 2 collects additional information such that it is fully informed about the
previous business cycle when a new cycle begins, firm 2 will choose a fiscal year that
! coincides with the business cycle (and with firm 1's fiscal year) if 
! 
" 2
# 2
$
4(2% r)2
7(1% r2)
! ends mid-way through the business cycle (M* = 
! 
T
2
) if 
! 
" 2
# 2
<
4(2$ r)2
7(1$ r2)
.
Proof:  See Appendix.
That is, the ability to collect information earlier than the end of the reporting period increases the
likelihood of staggered year-ends.  To see this note that, comparing expected profit expressions in (10)
and (8), collecting additional information about the previous business cycle lowers the "initial loss" while
keeping the "subsequent gain" unaltered.
13
  As a result, additional information collection improves the
probability of staggered year-ends.  Further, and consistent with results in prior literature on information
sharing, it can be shown that firm 2 may have incentives to disclose the additional information that it
collects privately.
14
  If the privately collected information is disclosed, the "initial loss" reduces to zero
and firm 2 always prefers to stagger.
Finally, a comparison of (10) and (8) also reveals that information about an additional (T-M)
components of 
! 
"
2
B#1 increases expected profits by 
! 
(1" r
2
)v
2# 2
4
M (T "M ) .  Therefore, as long as the cost
of collecting the additional information is less than this amount, it will be in firm 2’s interest to gather the
additional information.
                                                 
13
 With additional information about 
! 
"
2
B#1 the initial loss goes down from 
! 
"
4
9
# 2 (1" r 2)v 2M(T-M) to
! 
"
7
36
# 2 (1" r 2)v 2M(T-M).   Although both firms are now perfectly informed about 
! 
"i
B#1 the initial loss
does not reduce to zero because, as compared to coincident fiscal years, in this case the rival remains
uninformed about some components of firm 2's costs and, as prior research shows, the informed firm's
profits are lower when the rival is ignorant about the informed firm's costs. (Proposition 2 and 4i in Fried
[1984], Proposition 4.4 in Raith [1996], Proposition 1 in GalOr [1988]).
14
  In Cournot oligopolies allowing the rival to become better informed about the disclosing firm's costs
improves the expected profits of the informed firm. (Proposition 2 in Fried [1984], Proposition 4.4 in
Raith [1996], Proposition 1 in GalOr [1988]).
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4.3  When 
! 
"  < 
! 
"
In our model the degree of year-over-year serial correlation in unit costs is an increasing function
of 
! 
"
#
.  When 
! 
"  < 
! 
" , information about shocks from the current (rather than the prior) business cycle is
relatively more valuable in estimating costs.  The reporting process will yield information about cost
shocks from earlier in the current cycle only if the reporting period ends part way through the current
cycle.  Consistent with this thought Proposition 1 showed that when 
! 
"  < 
! 
"  the monopolist will choose a
fiscal year that ends at T/2.
A subsequent entrant into the industry must decide whether to coincide its fiscal year with the
business cycle or with the incumbent firm's or to place it spanning a completely different set of T periods.
If the incumbent firm is reporting at T/2, as a new season begins firm 2 cannot depend on the incumbent
firm’s reports for information related to all T periods of the prior season.  As a result the "initial cost" to
not coinciding with the business cycle is greater in this setting but is mitigated somewhat by the relatively
smaller magnitude of 
! 
" .  Additionally, the "subsequent gain" from not coinciding with the business cycle
(which came in the form of information about the current season) is also weaker since firm 2 already has
an opportunity to learn (albeit imperfectly) about the current season after firm 1 releases its report at T/2.
The net effect of these forces is detailed in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4  When 
! 
"  < 
! 
"  and the incumbent firm reports at T/2, firm 2 will choose a fiscal year
that
! ends between the end of the business season and firm 1's fiscal year-end, 0 < M*< T/2, if r ! 0.8
! ends with the business season, M* =0, if r <0.8.
Proof:  See Appendix.
Two aspects of this result are worth highlighting.
15
  First, in this setting there is never any reason
for firm 2 to cluster with firm 1.  If firm 2 chooses to deviate from the business cycle, it can always do
better by locating its fiscal year-end between the end of the business cycle and firm 1's fiscal year-end.
                                                 
15
  There exists another equilibrium that is symmetric to the equilibrium described in Proposition 4.  This
equilibrium occurs at M** = T-M*, and the equilibrium profits at M* and M** are equal for the two
firms.  As a result, firm 2 will be indifferent between M* and M**.
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Since firm 2 locates its year-end at M* = 0 or M* < T/2, and the incumbent firm locates at T/2, when 
! 
"  <
! 
"  dispersed year-ends for these two firms are always the outcome.  Second, and on a related note, it
follows that year-ends that don't coincide with the business cycle are more likely when costs exhibit low
auto-correlation (as indicated in our model by low values of 
! 
"
#
).  Results in the previous sections showed
that when 
! 
"
#
 > 1, both firm 1 and firm 2 choose to end their fiscal year with the business season as long as
r < 0.8; firm 2 deviates from this only for some (but not all) values of r " 0.8.  In contrast, when 
! 
"
#
 < 1,
firm 1 always chooses a fiscal year different from the business season whereas firm 2 makes that choice
for all values of r " 0.8
5. Discussion and Conclusion
In many industries a majority of the firms choose fiscal years that coincide with the business
cycle.  For instance, many retail firms choose end of January, after the post-Christmas rush, while firms
catering to the education market often choose the school year as their fiscal year.  On the other hand, there
are closely competing firms such as Adobe, Apple and Microsoft, all major players in the software
publishing industry and all catering to somewhat similar customers, that choose to end their fiscal years at
vastly different times - in November, September and June, respectively - even though December is the
most popular year-end in their industry.  Casual empiricism also shows that when changing fiscal years
firms often consider the fiscal years of peer firms.  For instance, when the software firm Versata Inc.
changed its fiscal year from 12/31 to 10/30 in 2002, it offered a bevy of strategic reasons:
"Versata has noted that several successful software companies have made a similar change and
have announced benefits from having a non-traditional fiscal year.  Moving to a year-end cycle
that is different than the traditional calendar yearend is intended to put Versata in an improved
position to close more direct business during the last month of each new fiscal quarter when there
may be less external and internal competition for customer time and resources.   Additionally, an
important part of Versata's strategy continues to be selling through channel partners. Since a
majority of Versata's channel partners have a calendar year fiscal quarter, Versata now has the
potential to support channel partners during the last month of their quarter."
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While there are numerous industry-specific factors that influence the reporting period choice,
these factors by themselves are not sufficient to explain the within-industry variation in reporting periods
that evidence in Table 1 reveals.  To explain the factors that determine whether fiscal year-ends within an
industry will be clustered or dispersed, this paper develops a model of reporting period choice that
incorporates both competitive forces and business seasonality.  The main results from the analysis are
summarized in Table 2 and yield the following insights.
The results show that higher values of 
! 
"
#
 are more likely to result in fiscal years that coincide
with the business cycle.  Since 
! 
"  and 
! 
"  are weights on information from the prior and current year,
respectively, higher values of 
! 
"
#
 are likely to be observed in industries with strong auto-correlation in
uncertain parameters (so that the significance of past information, as captured by 
! 
" , is high) and/or in
industries where the business season is highly cyclical such that earlier parts of the season have little
bearing on the later parts (
! 
"  is low).  This suggests that fiscal year-ends that coincide with the business
cycle are more likely for firms with relatively high serial correlations in their costs and/or for firms that
operate in industries with more within-season variations in their business.
Even though higher values of 
! 
"
#
 provide strong incentives for firms to coincide their fiscal year
with the business season, firms may still deviate from this choice and stagger their year-ends when
information transfer effects are strong.  One benefit of staggered year-ends is the ability to update own
information part way through one's own fiscal year by observing rivals' reports.  This ability is more
pronounced when cross-sectional correlation is high or when financial reports are informative about
industry-wide rather than firm-specific factors.  Since the possibility of learning from rivals’ reports is
higher when firms are similar, we obtain the seemingly counterintuitive result that similar firms are more
likely to choose dispersed disclosure timing.
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The results show that when 
! 
"
#
 > 1 staggering occurs only for relatively large values of r, where r
is the cross-sectional correlation in firms' uncertain parameter (costs).  In our model, when 
! 
"
#
 > 1
staggered year-ends occur only for some (not all) values of r that exceed 0.8.  This suggests that staggered
year-ends are relatively infrequent and this suggestion is consistent with empirical evidence.  Table 1
shows that of the 8,006 Compustat firms registered in the U.S. in 2005, about 73% cluster their year-end
at the most popular month in their respective industry group and only 27% deviate from this cluster.
Disaggregating this data further, of the 27% that deviate 16% choose year-ends such that even if the
annual year-ends don't match, the quarters still match up with the popular December year-end group.
Thus, only about 11% of the firms choose year-ends that result in both the annual and quarterly periods
being truly staggered with respect to the most popular fiscal period in their industry.
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If it is possible for firms to collect some of the information that fiscal reports provide earlier than
at the end of the fiscal year, Proposition 3 shows that staggered year-ends become more likely.  The
primary benefit of closing the books at the end of the business cycle is that information from the previous
cycle is available early in the next cycle.  If there is an alternative source of information regarding the
previous cycle, then firms can exploit the benefits of staggering (greater information about more recent
shocks) without foregoing the benefits of coinciding with the business cycle.
It is also worth noting that in our model there is no incentive for firms to cluster at any point other
than the end of the business cycle.  Proposition 4 shows that when the first firm chooses a fiscal year that
does not coincide with the business cycle, the second firm, ceteris paribus, never chooses to cluster with
firm 1.  Clustering year-ends around each other per se provides no benefits to firms, but ending the fiscal
year with the business cycle does.
17
  In other words, although the appearance may be one of herding,
firms do not necessarily move towards each other but towards a common business cycle.
                                                 
16
  These ratios change only slightly when we leave out the 288 Retail sector firms (2-dgit NAICS 44-45).
17
  There may be reasons other than business seasonality that prompt firms to choose the same year-end.
These reasons include convention, business cycles of customers and/or suppliers, capital market
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Finally, if information from the previous business cycle is important and if there already exist
some firms that are reporting with the business cycle, it makes it easier for subsequent entrants to the
industry to deviate from the business cycle in their reporting period choice.  This is evident from the fact
that the condition for the first firm in the industry to stagger with respect to the fiscal year is 
! 
"
#
 < 1
(Proposition 1), whereas the condition for the second firm that enters the industry (firm 2) to stagger  -
provided the first firm is reporting with the business cycle - is 
! 
" 2
# 2
<
(2$ r)2
4(1$ r 2)
 (Proposition 2).  When 
! 
"
#
 <
1 the monopolist's condition is met for all values of r, whereas the second firm's condition is met only for
certain (not all) values of r that exceed 0.8.
Conclusion
In order to understand the factors that determine whether fiscal year-ends within an industry will
be clustered or dispersed, and whether fiscal years will end with the business season, this paper develops
a model of reporting period choice that incorporates both competitive forces and business seasonality.
Overall, our results show that while it is business seasonality that is the primary determinant of reporting
period choice, competitive forces in the form of information transfer effects and proprietary disclosure
costs have the ability to make firms' fiscal years deviate from the business cycle.  Such deviation is more
likely when auto-correlation in firms' annual costs is low, when within-season variations in business
conditions are low, when cross-sectional correlation between costs of industry peers is high and/or when
affordable opportunities exist for collecting information that the year-end closing of books typically
provides.  Further, if incumbent firms are already reporting at the end of the business season, newer firms
may have a greater inclination to make a different choice.  The results also offer a novel rationale for why
the end of the business cycle is an attractive fiscal year-end.  Firms receive valuable managerial
information when books are closed at the end of reporting periods. The motivation to receive this
                                                                                                                                                              
incentives related to improving comparability with peers, the convenience of matching the fiscal year
with the tax year, etc.
23
information at an opportune time, rather than the ease of collecting information or any other factors,
makes the end of business cycle an attractive year-end in our setting.
Like all models our model is somewhat stylized and captures only some of the economic forces
that bear on the reporting choice.  However, this relatively simple model allows us to isolate and explain
the impact of the key economic forces clearly.  The overall insights provided by the model are robust and
generalizable to broader settings.
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Figure 1 Business Cycle and Fiscal Years
Figure 1 shows the arrangement of fiscal years for firms 1 and 2 when each business cycle (and fiscal year) spans eight operating periods.  When
business cycle B begins, firm 1 knows all shocks from busincess cycle B-1 (
! 
u
11
B"1 to 
! 
u
18
B"1) whereas firm 2 knows only the shocks 
! 
u
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B"1 to 
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Table 1  Clustering of Fiscal Year-ends in each of the firms
Distribution of fiscal year-ends in 2005 for firms incorporated in the U.S. for which year-ends and NAICS
were available on the 2007 COMPUSTAT tapes.
FYE! Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Industry Sector* #Firms
11 23 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 9% 0% 9% 0% 9% 4% 65%
21 455 2% 0% 2% 2% 0% 5% 1% 1% 4% 1% 0% 80%
22 277 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 89%
23 93 0% 0% 3% 2% 1% 8% 1% 0% 5% 2% 4% 73%
31-33 2,968 2% 1% 6% 2% 2% 8% 1% 1% 6% 2% 1% 67%
42 217 3% 3% 9% 1% 3% 8% 3% 2% 6% 0% 1% 60%
44-45 288 35% 4% 4% 1% 0% 3% 2% 2% 7% 1% 0% 40%
48-49 222 0% 0% 4% 0% 1% 3% 0% 1% 2% 0% 2% 86%
51 915 2% 1% 6% 1% 1% 6% 2% 1% 5% 2% 1% 72%
52 1,501 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 4% 1% 0% 88%
53 152 2% 0% 2% 1% 1% 7% 2% 0% 5% 1% 1% 80%
54 370 3% 0% 5% 1% 1% 7% 1% 1% 7% 1% 1% 70%
56 152 1% 2% 2% 2% 1% 5% 1% 1% 7% 2% 1% 74%
61 25 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 20% 4% 4% 8% 0% 0% 60%
62 132 0% 0% 2% 0% 1% 6% 2% 2% 8% 2% 0% 80%
71 57 2% 4% 0% 2% 2% 7% 4% 0% 4% 0% 2% 75%
72 131 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 6% 2% 2% 9% 2% 1% 69%
81 28 4% 0% 11% 4% 0% 11% 0% 0% 7% 4% 0% 61%
99 23 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 9% 0% 9% 0% 9% 4% 65%
8006 3% 1% 5% 1% 1% 6% 1% 1% 5% 2% 1% 73%
**  These sector classifications are based on U.S. Census Bureau’s 1997 NAICS definitions.  This
classification system is more current and more refined than the SIC classifications.  For instance, it
separately identifies an Information Sector (#51) which the SIC system does not.
Sector Names
11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 21 Mining 22 Utilities 23 Construction
31-33 Manufacturing 42 Wholesale 44-45 Retail 48-49 Transportation &Warehousing
51  Information 52 Finance a & Insurance 53 Real Estate
54  Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 56  Administrative Support and Waste Management
61  Educational Services 62  Health Care and Social Assistance
71  Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 72  Accommodation and Food Services
81  Other Services
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Table 2  Summary of Main Results
Firm 1’s choice Firm 2’s choice
! 
"
#
 > 1
(high serial
correlation; more
seasonal business)
Firm 1's reporting period
coincides with business cycle.
Firm 2's reporting period
coincides with the business cycle
(and with Firm 1’s) only if
" r < 0.8
" r ! 0.8 and 
! 
" 2
# 2
$
(2% r)2
4(1% r 2)
! 
"
#
 < 1
Firm 1 reports at T/2
Firm 2 never reports at T/2.
" Firm 2's reporting period
coincides with the business
cycle only if r < 0.8
" Firm 2's reporting period
ends between the end of the
business season and the end
of Firm1’s reporting period
when r ! 0.8.
Firm 1 is the incumbent firm and firm 2 is the subsequent entrant into the industry.
The table shows the main results from Propositions 2 and 4.
" When 
! 
"
#
 > 1, dispersed year-ends occur only for some (not all) values of r ! 0.8.
" When 
! 
"
#
 < 1, dispersed year-ends occur for all values of r.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
In each period t the monopolist maximizes expected profits 
! 
E"mt
B
= (A # ECmt
B
# qmt
B
)qmt
B , where
! 
EC
mt
B  are expected costs based on available information at the start of period t.  Profit-maximizing output
is:
! 
qmt
B • = 
! 
1
2
(A " c "# EC
mt
B
) (A1)
In the first M periods of the business season, 
! 
EC
mt
B is as detailed in equation (3). Plugging these
cost estimates in (A1), then using the resulting 
! 
qmt
B • in the realized profit function 
! 
"mt
B
= (A #Cmt
B
# qmt
B
)qmt
B
and taking expectation (before any of the random variables are realized) yields expected profits in the first
M periods.  Profits in each of the last (T-M) periods are calculated using cost estimates in equation (4)
and following similar steps.
Summing the profits over the T periods in the business cycle yields the expected profit expression
in (5).  The expected profit function is maximized with respect to M to yield the result in Proposition 1.
The second order condition for M* =T/2 to be a maxima is:
-
! 
1
2
v
2
(" 2 #$ 2)  < 0
and is satisfied when 
! 
" > 
! 
" .
Proof of Proposition 2:
In each period t firm i chooses output to maximize expected profits 
! 
E" it
B
= (A # ECit
B
#Qt
B
)qit
B ,
where 
! 
Qt
B  is the aggregate output in the industry.
In each of the first M periods of the business cycle firm 2's expected costs 
! 
EC
2t
B  are as given in
equation (6).  Because firm 1's fiscal year coincides with the business cycle, firm 1's cost estimates in
each of the first M operating periods are:
E(
! 
C
1t
B | 
! 
y1
F"1, 
! 
y2
F"1) = 
! 
c 
1
 + 
! 
" 1
1
!B"  for t ! {1, …, M}
Firm i's reaction function takes the form 
! 
qit
B
=
1
2
(A " ECit
B
" ˆ q jt
B
)  so that optimal output is given
by
! 
qit
B*
=
1
3
(A " 2ECit
B
+ EC jt
B
) .  Expected costs are plugged into 
! 
qit
B*  and the resulting expression for
optimal output is used to calculate the period t realized optimal profits 
! 
" it
B
= (A #Cit
B
#Qt
B*
)qit
B* , where t !
{1, …, M}.
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In the last (T-M) periods, after the release of firm 2's report 
! 
y
2
F  at end of period M, firm 2's costs
are as described in equation (7).  Firm 1 learns about the first M components of 
! 
"
1t
B  from 
! 
y
2
F  and therefore
estimates costs as:
E(
! 
C
1t
B | 
! 
y1
F"1, 
! 
y
2
F ) = 
! 
c 
1
 + 
! 
"
! 
"
1t
B#1 + 
!
!
"
#
$
$
%
&
'
=
M
B
ur
1
2
*
(
() for t ! {M+1, …, T}
With these expected costs, optimal profits in each of the last (T-M) periods are calculated as
described above.  Summing optimal profits over all T periods of the business season and taking
expectations before any random variables are realized (using the covariance structure specified in
equation (1)) yields the expected profit function in (8).  The second order condition for M* =T/2 to be a
maxima is given by:
! 
"
2 # 2 (2" r)2 " 4$ 2 (1" r 2)( )v 2
9
< 0
and is met iff 
! 
" 2
# 2
<
(2$ r)2
4(1$ r 2)
.
Proof of Proposition 3:
When firm 2 collects additional information and keeps it private, firm 1's cost estimates remain
unchanged and are as described in the proof for Proposition 2.  Firm 2's cost estimates are described in the
text.  Optimal expected profits are calculated using these cost estimates and following steps similar to
those described in the proof of Proposition 2.  (If firm 2 does not disclose its private information, the
Cournot game becomes one of asymmetric information; conjectures that optimal output is linear in the
private information are used to solve this game.) The second order condition for M* =T/2 to be a maxima
is given by:
! 
"
4# 2 (2" r)2 " 7$ 2 (1" r 2)( )v 2
36
< 0
and is met iff 
! 
" 2
# 2
<
4(2$ r)2
7(1$ r 2)
.
Proof of Proposition 4:
With 
! 
"  < 
! 
" , according to Proposition 1 firm 1 places its fiscal year mid-way through the business
season, at T/2.  Firm 2 can place its year-end before, with or after firm 1's.
Case 1: 0 " M " T/2
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Suppose firm 2 ends its fiscal year after the first M periods of the business season, where 0 " M "
T/2.  Then, the information environment in the industry will change over the business season in the
following way.  In the first M periods of fiscal year F, the latest reports available in the industry will be
! 
y1
F"1 (covering up to the first T/2 periods of the previous business cycle) and 
! 
y2
F"1 (covering up to the
first M periods, where M " T/2, of the previous business cycle).  At the end of the Mth period in fiscal
year F firm 2 will release its new report.  Therefore, in periods M+1 to T/2, the latest reports will be 
! 
y1
F"1
(as before) and 
! 
y
2
F  (covering up to the first M periods of the current business cycle). Finally, at the end of
the period 
! 
T
2
 firm 1 will release its report so that from periods (T/2 + 1) onwards the latest publicly
available reports will be 
! 
y
2
F  (as before) and 
! 
y
1
F  (covering up to the first T/2 periods of the current
business cycle).  Firm 2's expected profits for the T periods during the business cycle are given by
! 
"
2
# = 
! 
(A " 2c 2 + c 1)
2
T
9
+ 
! 
" 2
! 
(5" 4r)v
2
9
 (
! 
M
2
" M
T
2
+
3T
2
4
) + 
! 
" 2
! 
(5" 4r)v
2
9
! 
M
T
2
! 
"
(2" r )2v 2
36
(2M "T )(2M# 2 +T$ 2)  
! 
"
(1" 2r)2 v 2
36
(2M "T )(2M# 2 +T$ 2)
The optimal M is given by:
M* = 
! 
T
2
*
(5" 4r) + 3(1" r 2)( )(# 2 "$ 2)
2 # 2 (2" r)2 " 4$ 2 (1" r 2)( )
To be consistent with the starting assumption that 0 " M " T/2, it must be that M* lies between 0
and T/2; it is easy to show that this is true only for r ! 0.8.  Thus, M* is an equilibrium only if r ! 0.8.
The second order condition for M* to be a maxima is given by:
! 
"
2 # 2 (2" r)2 " 4$ 2 (1" r 2)( )v 2
9
< 0
 and is met iff 
! 
" 2
# 2
<
(2$ r)2
4(1$ r 2)
. With 
! 
"  " 
! 
" , the LHS is " 1 and when r ! 0.8,
! 
(2" r)
2
4(1" r
2
)
 is ! 1.  Therefore,
when (
! 
" "
! 
" ) and r ! 0.8 firm 2 will always choose to place its fiscal year-end at M*, where 0 " M* " T/2.
For lower values of r, firm 2 will coincide its fiscal year with the business season (M*=0).  (For r <0.8,
coinciding with the business season always yields higher expected profits than coinciding with firm 1's
fiscal year.)
Case 2: T/2 < M " T
Finally, if we start with the assumption that firm 2 chooses an M such that T/2 " M " T, there
exists an equilibrium at M** in which M** = T-M*.  Other properties of this equilibrium are similar to
the ones described above.  Expected profits at M* and at M** are identical.
